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The ability to trust a trading partner is fundamental to the development of complex economic relationships. Confidence in the actions of a trading partner may be supported in any of three ways. First, firms may use formal contracts, enforced through sanctions administered by courts, to govern trading relationships. Alternatively, confidence in trading partners may be based on knowledge gained through past interactions with the trading partner. The bilateral relationship allows firms to distinguish good and bad "types" (Watson 1999) . Cooperation may also evolve in a relationship over time, with the threat of breaking off the relationship serving as a sanction against bad behavior (Lindsey et al, 2001 ). Finally, firms may rely on a trading partner's reputation, based on information about the trading partner's behavior in other business or social relationships (Greif 1994; Granovetter 1986) . As with the bilateral relationships, reputation may serve either to identify types or to provide a sanction against improper behavior (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999b) . This paper examines the development of both formal and informal enforcement of contracts in the context of the transitions to market economies in Eastern Europe. Policy makers and policy advisors in the region have focused their attention on the development of the formal legal system (EBRD 1999) . This is approach is justified if one believes that bilateral and reputational enforcement act primarily as imperfect substitutes to formal enforcement when the latter is lacking. However, as we demonstrate in this paper, where courts are imperfect, informal enforcement may complement the formal legal system, allowing courts to function where they would otherwise be ineffective. Using firm level data, we show that the latter circumstances hold in Eastern Europe. Formal and informal enforcement do indeed complement one another in supporting trust among trading partners.
Published work using the same data set utilized here gives an indication of the interaction between bilateral and reputational enforcement (McMillan and Woodruff 1999b; Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002) , and the interaction between courts and bilateral relationships (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002) . We summarize the findings from this earlier work, and provide new evidence on the interaction between reputational networks and formal contracting. in this paper.
The manner in which the various contract enforcement mechanisms interact has important implications for public policy in the transition countries. Establishment of a legal system sufficient to enable firms and individuals to make and enforce written contracts is a worthy goal. The state's role in this is clear. But if the informal mechanisms complement formal enforcement, then policy should also be directed toward supporting increase flows of information among firms. By establishing credit reporting bureaus, establishing simple and clear accounting standards, and other similar actions, the state can play a role in ensuring that firms are able to learn about the reliability of trading partners more easily, allowing for a freer, more open, market to develop.
Section 2 begins with a review of the existing literature and the development of a very simple framework to guide the examination of the data. Section 3 describes the state of legal development in five Eastern European countries for which we have data, and describes the data itself. The results from previously published work and new analysis are presented in the fourth section, and some concluding remarks offered in the final section.
Section 2: Supporting Contractual Agreements
The importance of each of the three pillars of contract enforcement has been documented in the literature. Scholars have identified the important role played by informal enforcement from historical times predating the development of formal legal systems, and from more contemporaneous times in settings where formal institutions
have not yet been developed. Clifford Geertz (1978) provides a vivid description of the market bazaar in Morocco. Bilateral relationships are also important in money lending, particularly in rural settings. The importance of reputational enforcement has also been emphasized, particularly among small, closed groups of trading partners. (See, for example, Grief 1994; Landa 1994; and Clay, 1997 .) The literature also makes clear that the development of formal institutions does not make informal enforcement obsolete.
Even where formal legal institutions are well developed, as in the United States, trading relationships continue to be governed by informal enforcement, both bilateral (Macauley 1963 ) and reputational (Ellickson 1991 ).
The precise nature of the interaction between either bilateral or reputational enforcement on the one hand and formal enforcement on the other hand has been the subject of less discussion. The theoretical literature provides models in which formal and informal enforcement substitutes for one another, models in which they complement one another, and models in which they may do either of these, depending on the specific circumstances.
1 Kranton (1996) provides an example of the first type of model. In her model, those who fail to cooperate with trading partners must in the future revert to trading in the market where all agreements are fully contractible. This punishment imposed by this sanction is more severe when full contracting markets work poorly.
Hence, efficient formal contracting undermines informal cooperation because it weakens the sanction given to those who fail to cooperate. Klein (1996) develops the opposite case. He shows that more complex contracts can limit the gains from opportunistic behavior in the present relationship, and hence increase the likelihood that cooperation is sustained. Hence, formal and informal contracting may complement one another. More generally, Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) develop a theoretical model showing that explicit and implicit incentives may either substitute or complement one another. In some cases, either formal and informal incentives by themselves are too weak to elicit the 1 Throughout the paper, the terms complements and substitutes refer to production rather than demand. Klein (1996) points out that formal and informal enforcement can be substitutes in demand-in the sense that an increase in the price of one leads to heavier reliance on the other-at the same time they are complements in production-in the sense that the increased use of one increases the marginal value of using the other.
desired actions, but together may be sufficient to sustain cooperation in the relationship.
Below we sketch a brief model with the flavor of the Baker, Gibbons and Murphy model.
In contrast to the relatively active theoretical discussion of the interaction between informal and formal enforcement, there is much less empirical evidence on the interaction. Empirical testing depends on finding settings in which the availability of formal or informal enforcement varies in a systematic and exogenous manner. At least in part, the lack of empirical evidence reflects the difficulty in finding such settings. The quality of formal institutions generally changes slowly, making variance across time difficult to measure. One exception to this is Kranton and Swamy's (1996) results suggest that courts and relationships complement one another. Bernstein's (1996) less quantitative study of the US grain and feed industry also suggests complementarity between legal and extra-legal enforcement. Bernstein identifies "relationship preserving norms" (which are self enforced) and "end game norms" (which are enforced by courts or trade association arbitrators), suggesting that courts and informal arrangements are complementary.
Experimental economics has also provided some evidence on how the formal and informal enforcement interacts. Fehr and Falk (1999) find that the availability of formal contracts undermines cooperation, while Lazzarini, Miller and Zenger (2001) find that stricter formal enforcement facilitates informal cooperation.
The interaction of information and institutions:
The intuition for the interaction of formal and informal enforcement is straightforward. Courts are used when trading partners prove to be unreliable. Courts may be both costly to use and imperfect in their ability to resolve disputes. Informal networks provide information about the expected reliability of a trading partner. The use of informal networks allows firms to avoid at least some unreliable trading partners. Hence, reliance on networks reduces the frequency with which courts will be needed to resolve disputes. Less frequent use allows courts which are more expensive or less reliable to play a role in supporting contractual relationships. This intuition is formalized in a simple framework.
There are two firms, a buyer and a seller. The two firms may interact in a instantaneous relationship, in which the buyer pays cash for goods at the instant in which the seller delivers them. We refer to this as a low-risk relationship. Alternatively, the firms may enter into a relationship which involves higher risk for the seller. In this high risk relationship, the seller moves first, by delivering some goods to the buyer. The buyer 2 Written agreements do not necessarily imply reliance on formal enforcement. McMillan and Woodruff (1999) discuss the use of written agreements in Vietnam, at a time when formal legal enforcement was nonexistent. Managers reported that written contracts were important in clarifying disputes between trading partner in a purely bilateral setting, and in informal, sanction-based enforcement by third parties.
then decides whether to pay for the goods or abscond with them. Normalizing the profit from low risk relationships (e.g., cash sales) to zero, the seller realizes a positive profit π S >0 from high risk relationships in which the buyer cooperates and negative profits π L <0 from high risk relationships in which the buyer absconds. The success of the relationship for the seller depends on whether the buyer carries through on the agreement or not. A seller's expected profit from choosing high risk relationships can be shown to be:
It is apparent from equation (1) that an increase in either the reliability of the customer (α) or the reliability of the courts (θ) leads to an increase in the expected profit from the risky relationship. Moreover, equation (1) shows that more reliable customers and more reliable courts substitute for one another in producing profits for the seller.
The relationship is modeled with one-sided moral hazard. In reality, the buyer may face some risk as well.
For example, the seller may deliver defective merchandise. The data don't allow us to examine this side of the transaction. We don't know what information the buyer has about the seller, or whether the buyer believes courts are effective.
along the horizontal axis and the effectiveness of courts along the vertical axis. In the upper right-hand corner of the figure, customers always cooperate (α = 1), courts are perfectly reliable (θ = 1), and the profit from the relationship involving trust is π S >0. At the other extreme, in the lower left-hand corner, customers always deviate (α = 0), courts never make amends (θ = 1), and the profit from a trusting relationship is (π L -C) <0. In between these extremes, the expected profit in the relationship is given by equation 1. Figure 1A shows iso-profit lines, or combinations of α and θ which yield the same expected profit. A lower α requires a higher θ to result in the same expected profit, so the lines slope to the southeast. They are steeper when the cost of using courts is higher.
Assuming risk neutrality, sellers prefer the trusting relationship when α and θ lie to the northeast of this line, and the safe relationship otherwise. There are combinations of α and θ for which the expected profit from the trusting relationship is exactly zero. Suppose 5 Note that the distribution of α may depend on the reliability of the courts as perceived by buyers.
The models of Kali (1999) and Tirole (1996) presume that there are three types of trading partners: those who are reliable, those who are unreliable, and those who are opportunistic. The latter group behaves reliably when it pays to do so, and unreliably otherwise. As courts become more reliable, the opportunistic buyers behave reliably. In an uncertain legal environment where perceptions about the effectiveness of courts vary across the population, the buyers' behavior will be determined by their own belief about the effectiveness of courts, about which our survey provides no information. For simplicity, we presume that the buyer's distribution of α does not depend on the individual seller's perception of the courts' reliability.
Given the uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of legal enforcement in the transition environment, this assumption does not appear excessively unrealistic.
Sellers find buyers in one of two ways. They may select them randomly, which in our survey corresponds to "we advertised", "they contacted us", or similar responses. We assume these are random draws from the population of buyers, so that the expected α is equal to the mean of the distribution,α. Alternatively, manufacturers may learn about buyers through a business or social network. In our survey, this corresponds to customers who "are managed or owned by a family member", who were identified "through a previous business acquaintance," and so on. The prior information allows the seller to determine the reliability of the buyer with greater precision, and to avoid (high risk) relationships with unreliable trading partners. The average reliability of customers found through networks, then, is the average of the (truncated) part of the distribution lying above α*, a level discretely higher thanα.
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From an empirical perspective, our measure of the effectiveness of courts is also discrete. This is an artifact of the wording of the survey question rather than a reflection of reality. Sellers might continuously adjust their estimates of the probability that courts will reach just decisions, as assumed in the model. Our survey asked firms whether courts could enforce a contract with customers or suppliers. A negative response presumably represents a manager with a low value of θ, and a positive response a manager with a high value of θ. On average, the estimate of (θ negative response) should be discretely below the estimate of (θ positive response).
The discrete nature of movements in both α and θ leaves open the possibility shown in Figure 1B .
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The figure shows the iso-profit line representing a profit of zero.
Customers found through networks have reliability denoted α N ; those coming from 6 Customers identified through networks may also be more reliable because of reputational sanctions enforced by the network. This would reinforce the difference in reliability of customers found through networks and those coming from outside networks. The evidence on the use of networks to sanction trading partners is discussed below. But network sanctions are not necessary to drive a wedge between the reliability of customers found inside and outside networks. the zero profit line, and therefore has no effect. Both a belief in courts and prior information from networks are necessary to make risky relationships profitable.
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Thus, even a framework in which the reliability of customers and effectiveness of courts are always substitutes at the margin can produce predictions of complementarity in the data. For low levels of α and θ, the profit from the risky relationship is negative. An increase in α (or θ) by itself may result in a smaller loss rather than a larger gain. In such a case, the seller would choose not to enter the risky relationships, regardless of the higher α. While the model does not tell us on which side of the zero profit line the various combinations of α and θ lie, it does tell us that information networks and courts may appear as either complements or substitutes. Thus, the nature of the interaction between information networks and courts is an empirical question which we will examine with data from the Eastern European surveys.
Eastern Europe provides an interesting setting in which to examine these issues because commercial courts have developed quickly in many of the transition countries.
By the latter part of the 1990s, nearly ten years after the beginning of the transition, most
Eastern European countries had enacted legal reform and created at least modestly effective legal systems. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) conducts annual surveys of lawyers and legal academics in Eastern Europe. The 1999 survey focused on the effectiveness of commercial courts. The EBRD provides ratings of the legal infrastructure of each country, on a scale of 1 to 4+. A legal system with a 4 rating for effectiveness is one in which laws are "reasonably clear" enforcement of laws is "reasonably adequate." A 3 rating indicates that laws are clear, but enforcement is "inadequate or inconsistent," and a 2 rating indicates unclear laws and little as a greater frequency of networked relationships. That is,
, so that complex relationships are formed for a larger part of the distribution of α when courts are perceived to be effective. 8 The result is similar to Baker, Gibbons and Murphy's (1994) result that "in some circumstances, neither an implicit nor an explicit contract alone can generate nonnegative profit, but an appropriate combination of the two can" (p. 1128).
enforcement. In the 1999 survey, taken about ten years after the transition, the majority of transition countries earned a rating of 3 or better for commercial law. None rated a 4+, and only one (Slovenia) received a 4. However, Bulgaria, Estonia, Macedonia, Hungary and Romania were rated 4-for effectiveness, and nine countries-including Slovakia and Poland-were rated in the 3 range. Russia and Ukraine were among the eight countries rated 2, indicating an inadequate commercial legal infrastructure.
Section 3: The Data and Previously Reported Results
The data used here come from surveys conducted among manufacturing firms during 1997 in Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine. All of the surveyed firms had between 10 and 270 employees and were privately owned, though some of them were privatized state-owned enterprises. The survey is described in more detail in Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2000) .
We are interested in a measure of the level of trust in a buyer-seller relationship, and the characteristics of the relationship which correlate with the level of trust. Surveyed managers were asked a series of questions about their firms' oldest and newest customer relationship. Managers described relationships of varying complexity. Some sales are cash and carry, others involve some delay in payment. Some goods are produced to order, others are produced for inventory. These data form the basis of measuring trust in the relationship. For example, a seller requires a higher degree of confidence in a customer paying with delay than in a customer who pays on delivery.
There is also substantial variation in the information which manufacturers had about their customers, and in the manufacturing manager's belief about the effectiveness of courts. In regard to bilateral enforcement, some of the relationships identified in the survey are new; others are well established. In establishing and monitoring the relationships identified in the survey, firms sometimes use information networks; in other cases they do not.
With regard to courts, the five countries for which we have data have a wide range of scores for the EBRD's commercial law ratings. Romania scores best with a 4-, followed by Poland and Slovakia (3) and finally Russia (2+) and Ukraine (2). Thus, with respect to commercial law, the legal systems in these countries have a presence, but an The greater the percentage of the bill a manufacturer allows the customer to pay with delay, the greater the indicated level of trust in the relationship. On 9 Sellers allow some customers to pay as many as 30 days after delivery, without charging any interest.
Given the option, a buyer will always choose to pay with delay. Hence, variation in the proportion o the bill paid with delay reflects variation in the decision of the seller to offer credit rather than variation in the decision of the buyer to accept credit. We are also interested here in how the three pillars of supporting trust interact. On this, the existing work provides some discussion on the interaction between bilateral relationships on the one hand and both reputational and formal enforcement on the other.
We review this briefly before turning to the third nexus, the interaction of reputational enforcement and formal enforcement.
10 Social and business networks are identified with reference to the manager interviewed. Social networks include customers managed by a family member, by someone who was a friend before the relationship began, or by someone referred by a family member. Business networks include firms identified through previously existing customers or suppliers, or other firms producing products similar to the respondent's products. (2000) provide results which suggests that courts and bilateral relationships do substitute for one another. They find that belief in the effectiveness of courts has a significantly bigger impact during the first three months of a relationship than later in relationships. Sellers who believe courts are effective in enforcing contracts allow new customers to pay 16 percentage points more of their bill after delivery, but courts lose their significance in relationships which are more than 3 months old.
Finally, we turn to the interaction between reputational enforcement and formal legal enforcement, as yet unexplored in the data. This interaction is particularly important from a policy perspective because policy can affect the development of reputational enforcement. Establishment of credit bureaus, improvements in accounting standards are among the measures which might be expected to produce a freer flow of information and more quickly established reputations. In the following section of the paper, we examine the data for with .
Section 4: Measuring the interaction empirically: Following Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) , we use the percentage of the bill paid after delivery as one measure of the level of trust manufacturers have in customers. We limit the sample to customers which are privately owned and located in the same country as the manufacturer. That is, we exclude transactions with SOEs and export customers. We also limit the sample to manufacturers which are de novo startup, excluding those which formerly were SOEs. The ability to use courts may be different in relationships involving any of these excluded groups. The resulting sample is still over 1200 manufacturer-customer relationships. The right hand side variables of interest are those which indicate the use of a network in identifying the customer and the manager's belief in the effectiveness of the legal system in resolving disputes with trading partners.
We asked managers their primary source of information about customers before they started trading. About 18 percent of the time, the customer is managed by a family member, or someone who was a friend prior to the start of the relationship. In another 45 percent of the cases, the manager reported that another firm or a business association was the primary source of information about the customer. Other responses indicate a lower level of prior information about the customer.
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The previously published result reported above used separate measures for social and business networks. Because the impact of information from these two sources is very similar, and in the interest of simplicity, we combine these into one variable indicating information from either of these sources. We expect customers coming from these networks to be more reliable on average than those about whom there is no information at the start of the relationship. In other words, we assign a higher value of α to these customers.
In addition to information, we are also interested in the manager's belief about the ability of courts to enforce contracts with customers. The response to this question gives us a value for θ in the framework above. Table 1 reports the results of regressions using the percentage of the bill paid with delay as the dependent variable. In the first two columns, the information variable defined above and the manager's belief about the effectiveness of courts are included separately. The regressions also include variables indicating other characteristics of the selling firm (e.g., age of firm, number of employees), the buying firm (e.g., the number of employees, whether the firm is a retail, individual, or manufacturing firm), characteristics of the selling firm's manager (age, education, and others), and other variables described in the notes to Table 1 . The first column include no country or industry controls. The results indicate that customers coming from business or social networks pay about 7 percentage points more of their bill after delivery than those coming from outside these networks, Managers who believe that courts can enforce contracts allow customers to pay almost 10 percentage points more of their bill after delivery.
The second column country and industry controls to the regression. These controls have only a modest impact on the measured impact of courts, but result in a higher estimated impact for information networks. The additional percentage of the bill which customers coming from information networks pay after delivery increases from 7 to 12 points. This suggests that information networks are more commonly used in those countries and industries in which trade credit is less common.
To test whether information networks and courts are complements or substitutes, we next add a variable interacting these two variables. The interaction term takes a value of one in relationships which arose from an information network and in which the manufacturer's manager believes that courts are effective. Thus, the variable indicates the added value of courts among all those relationships arising from information networks, or the added value of information to those managers who believe that courts are effective in enforcing contracts. A negative sign on the interaction term would indicate that information networks and courts substitute for one another. A positive sign on the interaction term would indicate that the two means of enforcement compliment one another.
The results indicate that the interaction term is positive, and significant at the .05 level when industry/country controls are not included (Column 3) and at the .10 level when industry/country controls are included (Column 4). Indeed, the results in Columns 3 and 4 indicate that courts have no significant impact on the level of trade credit offered customers who do not come from information networks, and that information networks have no significant impact on the level of trade credit offered by managers who do not believe courts are effective. However, the combination of the two is sufficient to support trust in customers willingness to pay for goods delivered on credit. The situation is similar to that depicted in Figure 1B .
In sum, these regressions suggest that neither courts nor information networks by themselves are sufficient to support trust among startup firms in Eastern Europe.
Combined, however, they do support a greater level of trust in customers. Thus, they are complements in production. The use of one raises the marginal value of using the other.
Section 5: Discussion and conclusion:
Previous research has reached the conclusion that legal systems in Eastern
European countries are effective in regulation commercial transactions (Hendley, Murrell and Ryterman 2001; Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff 2002) . This finding is somewhat surprising given the extent of the reforms made to the legal systems after the transition from a planned to a market economy. The analysis in this paper suggests an important caveat to the existing literature. Courts do have an effect on commercial transactions, but the legal system is not yet efficient enough to support trust between anonymous trading partners. Rather, courts play a role only in conjunction with the use of information networks which help separate reliable from unreliable trading partners. The theoretical framework developed in this paper suggest one reason why this might be the case.
Information networks reduce the probability of having to use to courts, allowing less efficient legal institutions to play a role in contracting.
From a policy perspective, the complementarity suggests that policy should focus not only on legal reform, but also on the development of private sector institutions which Table 1 Regressions from random effects regressions, grouped at the level of the manufacturer interviewed. Each regression also includes variables indicating the duration of the realtionship with the customer (4 dummy variables), the number of employees in the interviewed firm (3 dummy variables); the age of the firm (3 dummy variables); a variable indicating that the firm received a bank loan in 1996, a variable indicating that the firm was spun off from a state-owned firm; variables indicating that the entrepreneur is younger than 30, between 30 and 40 years old, or between 40 and 50 years old; variables indicating the manager has between 13 and 16 years of schooling and 17 or more years of schooling; and a variable indicating the manager was formerly a high level manager in a state-owned firm, variables indicating the customer is a retailer/wholesaler, the customer is an individual, the customer is foreign-owned, the customer is located in a different city, and variables indicating the customer has 16-50 employees, 51-100 employees,or more than 100 employees (15 or fewer employees is the comparison group).
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